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POLITICAL MACHINES: THE ROLE OF SOFTWARE IN ENABLING 
AND DETECTING PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING UNDER THE 
WHITFORD STANDARD 
Graeme Earle* 
Partisan gerrymandering, the practice of shaping district lines 
to the advantage of one political party, has haunted American 
politics for centuries. Innovations in districting software have 
sharpened the effects of partisan gerrymanders by increasing their 
advantages while concealing their creation. In response, courts are 
reevaluating the judicial manageability of partisan 
gerrymandering. Any standard arising from this reevaluation will 
inevitably require plaintiffs to prove that the drafters of district 
plans intended to gerrymander. Due to the complexity of measuring 
partisan advantage, this proof will need to come in the form of 
witness testimony or close observation of the districting process. By 
using automated districting software, legislators could gerrymander 
without leaving behind any of this critical evidence, thereby 
enabling partisan gerrymandering. New laws, policy, and 
improvements to algorithmic generations of alternative district 
plans promise to preserve the democratic process by preventing 
gerrymanders altogether or detecting gerrymanders based on their 
effects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of drawing voting 
districts to favor one political party over the other.1 The shape of 
voting districts can disadvantage a political party by diluting the 
power of that parties’ votes until they win fewer seats relative to the 
number of votes they secure.2 Partisan gerrymanders reduce the 
power of voters by “packing” them into districts that win by 
excessive margins3 and by “cracking” voters across multiple 
districts that each lose by slim margins.4 Together, these methods 
can allow political parties to entrench themselves in office by 
consistently holding a legislative majority even when they fail to 
win a majority of votes, effectively stripping away the public’s 
voting power.5 
                                               
 1 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986) (explaining that a 
“reapportionment plan constituted a political gerrymander” when it intended to 
disadvantage a political party by arranging district lines to dilute votes cast for 
that party). 
 2 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 831, 834 (2015) 
(explaining how a gerrymandered district plan can secure more seats for a political 
party even when that party wins fewer votes). 
 3 Id. A district is “packed” when a large majority of voters support one political 
party in excess of the number required to win that district’s election. Id. 
 4 Id. A district is “cracked” when the majority party consistently wins by a slim 
margin, causing minority votes to count for nothing. Id. 
 5 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 886 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“The danger 
with extreme partisan gerrymanders is that they entrench a political party in 
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Once or twice a decade, the Supreme Court considers the issue 
of partisan gerrymandering.6 Nevertheless, the Court has generally 
refrained from striking down district plans as unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymanders.7 Courts have hesitated to interfere with 
partisan gerrymandering in large part due to the practice’s long 
history8 and the legislature’s constitutional mandate to redraw 
district lines.9 The most compelling reason for the Court’s refusal to 
interfere with partisan gerrymandering has been the lack of a 
judicially manageable standard.10 Unlike racial gerrymandering, 
partisan gerrymandering involves mutable characteristics whose 
measurement would “cast[] [judges] forth upon a sea of 
imponderables”11 as they try to determine exactly how much partisan 
advantage a district plan must confer before courts have the power 
to intervene. 
                                               
power, making that party—and therefore the state government—impervious to 
the interests of citizens affiliated with other political parties.”). 
 6 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 361 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Where unjustified entrenchment takes place, voters find it far more difficult to 
remove those responsible for a government they do not want; and . . . democratic 
values are dishonored.”); see also Davis, 478 U.S. at 124 (“[E]ach political group 
in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any 
other political group.”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (holding 
that district plans which disproportionately affect the voting strength of political 
groups “may be vulnerable” to challenges under the Equal Protection clause); 
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (holding that district plans may be 
challenged as unconstitutional when they “minimize or cancel out the voting 
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population”). 
 7 See Davis, 478 U.S. at 143 (holding that evidence of a partisan gerrymander 
failed to “surmount the threshold requirement” of showing how much partisan 
advantage would constitute too much); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (“Eighteen 
years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is 
incapable of principled application. We would therefore overrule that case, and 
decline to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.”). 
 8 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274 (“Political gerrymanders are not new to the 
American scene.”). 
 9 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 4 (conferring to legislatures the power to determine “the 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections”). 
 10 See League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) 
(holding that the plaintiffs presented no “workable test for judging partisan 
gerrymanders”); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[W]e must conclude that 
political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable . . . .”). 
 11 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290. 
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Free from fear of court intervention, legislatures have crafted 
powerful and blatant gerrymanders. For example, when citizens 
brought suit against North Carolina’s 2016 Congressional District 
Plan, one of the members of the legislative committee in charge of 
drafting that plan admitted to the court that he “propose[d] that [the 
Committee] draw the maps to give a partisan advantage to 10 
Republicans and 3 Democrats because [he] d[id] not believe it 
[would be] possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 
Democrats.”12 The Supreme Court later struck down the plan as a 
racial gerrymander.13 However, had the plan not gerrymandered 
along racial lines, the North Carolina GOP would have avoided 
court intervention despite the fact that the committee member 
“‘acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a political gerrymander,’ 
which [the drafting Committee member] maintained ‘is not against 
the law.’”14 
In 2012, the Wisconsin district court faced a similarly blatant 
gerrymander when the Wisconsin Republican Party won 60 out of 
99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly despite only winning 48.6% of 
the vote.15 When members of the public sued, the Wisconsin district 
court found itself thrust into Scalia’s “sea of imponderables.”16 To 
navigate its waters, the court produced the following standard for 
the judicial management of partisan gerrymandering: 
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause prohibit a 
redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to place a severe impediment 
on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of 
their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified 
on other, legitimate legislative grounds.17 
In October of 2017, the Supreme Court considered whether this 
standard is judicially manageable.18 
                                               
 12 Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376, 378–79 (2017) (alterations 
in original). 
 13 See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017) (affirming the lower 
court’s finding that North Carolina’s 2016 Congressional District plan constituted 
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander). 
 14 Common Cause, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 378–79 (alterations in original). 
 15 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2016).  
 16 Id. at 884 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290). 
 17 Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161). 
 18 See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
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Even if the Whitford standard holds, it will not spell the end for 
partisan gerrymandering. The Whitford standard requires a plaintiff 
to prove an intent to gerrymander, in addition to the effects arising 
from that intent.19 So far, the ample direct and circumstantial 
evidence arising from blatant partisan gerrymandering have made 
intent and effects easier to prove.20 The Court in Whitford, however, 
foresaw a world where intent becomes difficult to prove as “the 
drafters’ intent . . . is hidden from the casual observer.”21 
Automated districting software will enable legislatures to hide 
the intent and effects of their gerrymanders from all observers, 
casual or otherwise. By producing district plans without leaving 
behind the “far more direct” evidence relied upon in previous 
cases,22 automated districting software would obscure a legislature’s 
intent to gerrymander. By improving traditional districting 
objectives alongside partisan advantage, automated districting 
software would hide the effects of a gerrymander. Together, this 
would leave plaintiffs with a difficult evidentiary burden. Meeting 
this burden will require self-regulation on the part of the legislature, 
tailored public disclosure laws, or improved techniques for 
algorithmically generating alternative district plans. 
This Recent Development will present its argument in three 
parts. Part II will explain how automated districting software will 
impede plaintiffs’ ability to bring claims of partisan gerrymandering 
by hiding a legislature’s intent to gerrymander and the effects that 
the gerrymander has on the district plan. Part III will explore 
solutions to automated districting software including third party 
voting commissions, transparent redistricting, and improved 
methods for detecting partisan gerrymanders. 
                                               
 19 See id. at 890 (explaining that they were “able to discern the legislature’s 
intent more easily and less intrusively because the evidence [was] far more 
direct”). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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II. THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATED DISTRICTING SOFTWARE ON 
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
Drafting gerrymanders by hand must have felt like toasting a 
slice of bread over a campfire. The process was messy, imprecise, 
and left distinct, visible marks.23 Even the term “gerrymander” 
originates from a district approved in 1812 by early American 
politician Elbridge Gerry.24 The district pursued partisan advantage 
over traditional districting objectives like compactness or equal 
population, and as a result it twisted grotesquely into a salamander-
like silhouette that satirists at the time dubbed a “Gerry-mander.”25 
Modern districting more closely resembles toasting a slice of 
bread on a stovetop. Technology aids drafters, but the process still 
requires human attention. Districting software has become 
increasingly accessible and convenient.26 Now, state and national 
governments redistrict using established software.27 Most state 
governments use semi-automated software based on Geographic 
Information Software (GIS),28 which assists drafters and analysts by 
setting lines along natural boundaries and making minor 
adjustments where needed.29 Convenient enough to warrant their 
price tag, semi-automated districting software still requires human 
drafters to construct maps and analysts to calculate values that the 
                                               
 23 See Greg Miller, The Map That Popularized the Word ‘Gerrymander’, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (June 28, 2017), 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/map-gerrymander-redistricting-
history-newspaper/ (recalling how the practice of gerrymandering predates 
Congress and how early gerrymanders were so visually distinct as to resemble 
“horrid monster[s]”). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See Robert G. Boatright et al., Teaching Redistricting: Letting the People 
Draw the Lines for the People’s House, 46 POL. SCI. & POL. 387, 387 (2013). 
 27 See autoBound, CITYGATEGIS, 
http://www.citygategis.com/products/autobound (last visited October 18, 2017) 
(“AutoBound is the premier redistricting application developed by Citygate 
GIS . . . . AutoBound was the primary redistricting application used in over 30 
states for creating the 2000 Congressional and Legislative districts.”). 
 28 See id. (touting that twenty-nine U.S. state governments currently use their 
GIS to redistrict). 
 29 See id. (enumerating the benefits of their GIS, including boundary-setting and 
a degree of automation). 
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program does not internally generate.30 For example, in Whitford, 
“[t]he process of drafting and evaluating . . . alternative district maps 
spanned several months” and required a commissioned team of 
drafters and a professional analyst.31 Even with the aid of these 
technologies, legislatures still produce gerrymanders, which casual 
observers can visually distinguish from legitimate districts.32 
Creating districts using automated software will resemble 
toasting bread in a toaster. Drafters need only insert data, set the dial, 
and wait until the software generates a complete district plan. These 
programs are overwhelmingly “heuristic” in that they initially create 
bad plans and then refine those plans over time based on 
predetermined factors.33 There are several ways to go about refining 
these plans ranging from slowly tweaking district boundaries all the 
way to rapidly generating and culling batches of plans until an 
acceptable plan evolves.34 Whatever the method, these programs 
generate plans from start to finish without additional human input. 
Automated districting software can produce gerrymanders 
“hidden from the casual observer.”35 The lack of human attention 
during the districting process leaves behind far less evidence of a 
                                               
 30 See id. Mapping software displays the boundaries between communities of 
interest and can adjust lines to even out population between districts. 
Compactness and partisan advantage, however, must be user-defined. Id. 
 31 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 891 (2016). 
 32 See Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional 
Districts, WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/15/americas-most-
gerrymandered-congressional-districts/?utm_term=.399426546d97 (explaining 
how the “funky” shape of a district “can serve as a useful proxy for how 
gerrymandered the district is”). 
 33 See Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated 
Redistricting: Is Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L. J. 81, 
123–24 (1997). For example, automated software instructed to value compactness 
over equal population will sacrifice some population equality to improve 
compactness. 
 34 Id. To do this, the software creates a population of plans that deviate slightly 
from the original in terms of desired factors. From that population, it selects a 
subset of plans which express the greatest mix of these desired factors. Id. The 
program then deletes plans falling outside of this selected subset, and it uses the 
remaining subset to generate the next population. Id. 
 35 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 890. 
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legislature’s intent to gerrymander. Further, the pursuit of traditional 
districting objectives such as compactness and equal population 
prevents observers from using these factors as “a useful proxy for 
how gerrymandered the district is.”36 
A. How Automated Districting Software Hides the Intent to 
Gerrymander 
To successfully claim partisan gerrymandering, claimants must 
prove that the body in control of implementing the district plan 
gerrymandered intentionally.37 Courts have considered two 
frameworks for these claims. Originally, courts framed 
gerrymandering as a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
issue.38 Because political affiliation is not a universally invidious 
classifier like race or geography, the Supreme Court initially 
designed a difficult test when applying equal protection to partisan 
gerrymandering.39 To avoid the issue of classifiers altogether, 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy proposed that partisan 
gerrymandering be framed under the First Amendment.40 So far, the 
Supreme Court has rejected the First Amendment framework.41 As 
Justice Scalia articulated in Vieth, “a First Amendment claim, if it 
were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of political 
affiliation in districting,” but the Court had already acknowledged 
that some considerations of political affiliation were appropriate in 
                                               
 36 Ingraham, supra note 32. 
 37 See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
 38 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 562 (1964) (holding that 
“[l]egislatures represent people,” and so Constitutional protection of political 
equality must mean “one person, one vote”). 
 39 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133–36 (1986) (holding that partisan 
gerrymandering violates equal protection only when it “substantially 
disadvantages certain voters” across several elections). 
 40 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(arguing that allegations of partisan gerrymandering “involve the First 
Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their 
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a 
political party, or their expression of political views”). 
 41 See id. at 281 (plurality opinion); see also League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418–19 (2006). 
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redistricting.42 These Fourteenth Amendment claims require proof 
of intent to discriminate.43 As such, claims of partisan 
gerrymandering continue to require proof of discriminatory intent. 
Courts consider direct and circumstantial evidence when 
identifying discriminatory intent.44 In the context of partisan 
gerrymandering, evidence of discriminatory intent includes direct 
admission of intent,45 witness testimony,46 and documents detailing 
the drafting process.47 For example, the drafters and analysts in 
Whitford v. Gill served as key expert witnesses when establishing 
the legislature’s intent to gerrymander.48 The drafters of the district 
plan in Whitford testified that they labeled potential plans as 
“Assertive” or “Aggressive” to reflect the partisan advantage that a 
particular plan would confer to the GOP under foreseeable 
circumstances.49 The Republican legislative leadership assessed 
these plans based on “S” curves constructed by an analyst.50 These 
“S” curves visually displayed the partisan advantage conferred by 
                                               
 42 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 294 (plurality opinion) (holding that some political 
considerations, such as competitive districts, are appropriate). 
 43 See Davis, 478 U.S. at 127 (holding that plaintiffs bringing Fourteenth 
Amendment claims of partisan gerrymandering must prove that the legislature 
discriminated intentionally). 
 44 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977) (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of 
intent as may be available.”). 
 45 See Common Cause v. Rucho, 240 F. Supp. 3d 376, 378–79 (2017) 
(describing how the legislature “‘acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a 
political gerrymander,’ which [the drafting Committee member] maintained ‘is 
not against the law’”). 
 46 See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 911–12 (2016). 
 47 See id. at 850–51 (recounting documents of Wisconsin’s 2012 district plan 
showing the emphasis placed on partisan advantage). 
 48 See id. at 923 (finding an intent to gerrymander because “[t]he drafters 
themselves disproved any argument to the contrary each time they produced a 
statewide draft plan that performed satisfactorily on legitimate districting criteria 
without attaining an expected partisan advantage as drastic as [the implemented 
plan]”). 
 49 Id. at 849. 
 50 See id. at 850–51 (explaining that graphs displaying the number of seats the 
GOP would win relative to the percentage of votes they received formed an “S” 
shape). 
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each plan across a range of possible electoral scenarios.51 One of the 
drafters presented their plans to the Republican caucus, and in his 
notes for that presentation, wrote, “[t]he maps we pass will 
determine who’s [in the Wisconsin Assembly] 10 years from 
now.”52 
So far, cases of gerrymandering have depended on these 
document trails and witness testimony to prove discriminatory 
intent. In Cooper v. Harris, the Supreme Court differentiated the 
plaintiffs’ successful claim of racial gerrymandering from failed 
claims by noting how the successful claim “turned not on the 
possibility of creating more optimally constructed districts, but on 
direct evidence of the General Assembly’s intent in creating the 
actual District 12.”53 In Whitford v. Gill, recognizing the importance 
of the documents used to produce the gerrymandered district plan, 
the Wisconsin legislature resisted three court orders for document 
production before finally relinquishing the documents alongside a 
fine of $17,000.54 Legislatures understand the importance of these 
witnesses and records, and so a clear step in hiding their intent to 
gerrymander from the “casual observer”55 would be to ensure that 
these witnesses and records never existed in the first place. 
Automated districting software would accomplish an interested 
legislature’s goal of removing direct and circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent from the public eye. Existing open-source 
software can be acquired freely and anonymously and used by 
individuals with limited software experience.56 With limited 
development, this software could become intuitive enough for use 
                                               
 51 See id. 
 52 Id. at 853. 
 53 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1462–63 (2017) (explaining also how 
District 12 discriminated against black voters by diluting their voting power). 
 54 See Matthew DeFour, Democrats’ Short-lived 2012 Recall Victory Led to 




 55 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 890. 
 56 See generally Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better 
Automated Redistricting, J. STAT. SOFTWARE, June 2011, at 1 (presenting open 
source redistricting software that runs on freely available software). 
DEC. 2017] BIASED MACHINES 77 
by completely untrained individuals. In that case, a single member 
of the legislature could independently draft the state’s district plan. 
Worse yet, a trained drafter could direct the software to produce a 
less extreme gerrymander that falls just out of reach of the courts’ 
tentative attempts at judicial management.57 This would leave 
potential plaintiffs with few witnesses capable of testifying to the 
intent behind the creation of the district plan. 
Automated districting software would also do away with the 
document trail detailing the drafting process. Like human drafters, 
heuristic redistricting software generates alternative district plans as 
it pursues its objectives.58 Unlike human drafters, however, 
automated software generates anywhere from hundreds to thousands 
of alternative plans in the span of minutes,59 and the programs often 
delete old iterations once they are no longer needed.60 Unless 
mandated by public record law, legislatures would have no need to 
stockpile drafted plans for analysis. Instead, they would receive a 
single, finished product with no trail of breadcrumbs marking the 
intent behind its creation. 
Because automated districting software sweeps away its own 
breadcrumb trail, legislatures could evade accusations of removing 
information from the public record. Legislatures cannot withhold 
information from the public record if the legislature never recorded 
that information in the first place.61 If the lone drafter of a district 
plan was called as a witness and asked what they inputted into their 
                                               
 57 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 
(2017) (No. 16-1161) (acknowledging that the proposed legal standard only 
intended to catch “the extreme gerrymander, the one that is fundamentally 
antidemocratic and is going to last for the full decade”). 
 58 See Altman & McDonald, supra note 56, at 14–15. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See Kevin Baas, AUTO-REDISTRICT, http://autoredistrict.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2017). 
 61 See Micah Altman et al., Revealing Preferences: Why Gerrymanders are 
Hard to Prove, and What to Do about It 14 (Mar. 22, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Social Science Research Network), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2583528 (explaining how in cases of partisan 
gerrymandering, even when courts “provide plaintiffs access to plans, reports, 
emails, and other information shielded from public view,” those “plaintiffs and 
courts will only gather as much evidence as was archived”). 
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districting software, the drafter could simply reply, “I did not write 
it down and do not remember.” How would the court distinguish 
between a malicious legislature attempting to defraud the public 
from an innocent legislature who simply wanted to cheaply and 
quickly draft a new district plan? The number of possible district 
plans for a state approaches infinity.62 Armed only with a copy of 
the program and an observable district plan, a researcher who hunts 
for a legislature’s intent to gerrymander would search for a needle 
in a haystack. Without a preemptive requirement to archive the 
districting process, then, legislatures will leave little to no direct or 
circumstantial evidence of their intent to gerrymander. 
Even without these tools, strong evidence of the effects of a 
defendant’s action can allow courts to statistically infer the 
defendant’s intent. For example, disparate impact Title VII 
employment discrimination claims are also grounded in Fourteenth 
Amendment anti-discrimination law.63 In these claims, plaintiffs can 
establish an employer’s intent to discriminate by proving “gross 
statistical disparities” in that employer’s practices.64 In Hazelwood 
School District v. United States,65 the Supreme Court compared the 
differences between the hiring practices of the defendant to the 
hiring practices of the general population.66 This analysis assumed 
that absent discriminatory intent, the defendant’s hiring practices 
should at least resemble the hiring practices of the general public. 
The Supreme Court explained that trial courts should only infer an 
intent to discriminate when the plaintiffs proved a gross disparity 
between what the defendant’s hiring practices were and what the 
defendant’s hiring practices should have been.67 
                                               
 62 Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5.4 ELECTION L.J. 412, 
419 (2006). 
 63 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977) (holding 
that discriminatory hiring practiced deprived minority workers of their Fourteenth 
Amendment right to equal protection). 
 64 Id. at 307. 
    65 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. (“‘[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that 
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less 
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the 
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Gross statistical disparity is harder to prove than ordinary 
disparity.68 Circumstantial evidence can establish a disparity by 
showing at least some inequality.69 Gross disparity, however, 
requires proof of the degree of inequality.70 This proof must come in 
the form of statistical evidence, and courts have come to interpret 
the standard as requiring confidence stemming from statistical 
significance.71 As the next section will show, however, automated 
software makes the effects of partisan gerrymandering difficult to 
prove even without a requirement of statistical significance. 
B. How Automated Districting Software Hides the Effects of a 
Gerrymander 
Under a Fourteenth Amendment framework, intent is not 
enough to compel court action in the face of a partisan gerrymander. 
As the Supreme Court articulated in Davis v. Bandemer, “even if a 
state legislature redistricts with the specific intention of 
disadvantaging one political party’s election prospects, we do not 
believe that there has been an unconstitutional discrimination 
against members of that party unless the redistricting does in fact 
disadvantage it at the polls.”72 To successfully bring a claim of 
partisan gerrymandering, then, plaintiffs must show that the 
gerrymander has an effect on the district plan.73 
                                               
community from which employees are hired.”) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977)). 
 68 See id. at 311–12 (“[T]he disparity between 3.7% (the percentage of Negro 
teachers hired by Hazelwood in 1972-1973 and 1973-1974) and 5.7% may be 
sufficiently small to weaken the Government’s other proof, while the disparity 
between 3.7% and 15.4% may be sufficiently large to reinforce it.”). 
 69 See id. at 309 n.15 (explaining that “where relevant aspects of the 
decisionmaking process had undergone little change” after implementation of 
Title VII could serve as evidence of racial discrimination). 
 70 See id.; see also Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical Disparities” as Evidence 
of a Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 
22 LAB. LAW. 271, 272 (2007) (noting that “lower courts frequently have turned 
to ‘statistical significance’ as the measuring rod” for gross disparity). 
 71 See King, supra note 70, at 272. 
 72 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986). 
 73 See id. (indicating that unlawful discrimination in redistricting will only be 
found where the redistricting “does [damage] at the polls”). 
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One traditional effect of a gerrymander is the loss of legitimate 
districting objectives such as compactness or equal population.74 As 
recently as 2004, the Supreme Court considered it a “well-settled 
principle[]” that “a district’s peculiar shape might be a symptom of 
an illicit purpose in the line-drawing process.”75 This line of thinking 
stems from the fact that previous districting techniques prioritized 
partisan advantage at the cost of traditional districting objectives 
such that the resulting districts warped into unusual shapes.76 Even 
gerrymanders drafted using modern mapping software can display 
abnormal shapes.77 For example, North Carolina’s District 12 snakes 
along I-85 like a thread, precisely enveloping minority 
communities.78 
Some modern gerrymanders leverage mapping software to 
become visually indistinguishable from non-gerrymandered plans,79 
but even those plans sacrifice some traditional districting objectives 
to maximize partisan advantage. For example, the human drafters in 
Whitford performed an “eyeball test” to ensure that traditional 
districting principles did not fall outside acceptable boundaries.80 As 
a result, each iteration of their district plan increased in terms of 
partisan advantage, but their compliance with traditional districting 
objectives remained steady.81 The court later held that though the 
drafters “were attentive to traditional districting criteria,” the effects 
of their gerrymander remained evident by their series of maps which 
“improved upon the anticipated pro-Republican advantage.”82 
Automated districting software can pursue these factors 
alongside partisan advantage.83 Though this pursuit could come at 
                                               
 74 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 321 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Miller, supra note 23. 
 77 See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1462–63 (2017) (holding that North 
Carolina’s District 12 is a racial gerrymander). 
 78 See id. 
 79 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 889 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“Highly 
sophisticated mapping software now allows lawmakers to pursue partisan 
advantage without sacrificing compliance with traditional districting criteria.”). 
 80 Id. at 849. 
 81 See id. 
 82 Id. at 849–50. 
 83 See Altman & McDonald, supra note 56, at 14–15. 
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the cost of some partisan advantage, it would confound attempts to 
find the effects of gerrymandering by correlating increases in one 
factor to increases in the other. If, for example, increases in 
compactness equally corresponded to increases in partisan 
advantage, an observer would not immediately know whether the 
drafters pursued partisan advantage as its own objective or, 
alternatively, the innocent pursuit of compactness tragically resulted 
in disparate partisan advantage because of natural factors. 
Instead, analysis of the effects of a partisan gerrymander would 
depend entirely on the comparison between the partisan advantage 
observed in the gerrymander and the average partisan advantage that 
would have been observed in the absence of a gerrymander.84 As in 
Hazelwood,85 plaintiffs attempting to infer a discriminatory intent to 
gerrymander from the effects of that gerrymander would need to 
prove a “gross disparity” between the partisan advantage a district 
plan conferred and the partisan advantage that district plan should 
have conferred absent discriminatory intent. Several metrics allow 
experts to attribute the partisan advantage observed in a single 
election to the effects of a district plan.86 The difficulty arises when 
attempting to determine how much partisan advantage a district plan 
should have conferred.87 
Natural factors such as political geography and shifting voter 
preferences significantly impact the partisan advantage conferred by 
a district plan.88 Certain political groups tend to live in denser 
populations than others.89 When drawing districts to maximize 
                                               
 84 See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 920 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 85 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977). 
 86 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 835–36 (2015). 
 87 See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 920 (acknowledging that the ever-changing 
and difficult to measure metrics of partisan advantage make it “more difficult to 
draw politically competitive districts” in some parts of the state). 
 88 See Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from 
Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the 
Effect of Gerrymandering in the US House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329, 330 
(2016). 
 89 Report for Defendants, Nicholas Goedert at 11, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 
3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc) (explaining that Wisconsin 
Democrats lived in denser populations than Wisconsin Republicans). 
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compactness and equal population, those dense populations more 
likely fall in the same district. This weakens the voting strength of 
those political groups by unintentionally packing them together until 
they elect candidates by wide margins. In Whitford, Wisconsin 
successfully convinced the court that its “political geography 
naturally favors Republicans because Democratic voters reside in 
more geographically concentrated areas.”90 Consequently, the court 
recognized that perfect proportionality between seats and votes 
could not serve as an accurate guidepost for the partisan advantage 
a district plan should confer in the absence of a partisan 
gerrymander.91 
These natural factors impede the quantification of partisan 
advantage for establishing a gross disparity. When challenged, the 
plaintiffs’ experts in Whitford acknowledged that “partisan intent is 
its own independent inquiry” separate from their analyses of the 
district plan’s effects.92 The natural factors affecting partisan 
advantage do not lay stagnant. Even neutral district plans produce 
wildly disparate partisan advantages from state to state and year to 
year.93 Tides of voters supporting an attractive candidate can create 
the false appearance of “packed” districts.94 Droughts, where an 
otherwise dominant political party fails to muster to the polls, can 
tip the scales across multiple districts and create the false appearance 
of “cracking.”95 Dramatic shifts in population as industries grow and 
                                               
 90 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 912. 
 91 See id. 
 92 Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Report, Simon Jackman at 3, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. 
Supp. 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (3:15-cv-00421-bbc). 
 93 Report for Defendants, Nicholas Goedert at 11, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 
3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc) (showing that 45% of all plans 
observed in Professor Simon Jackman’s historical study at some point expressed 
enough partisan advantage to attract judicial scrutiny under the Whitford 
standard). 
 94 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 86, at 834. A district is “packed” 
when a large majority of voters support one political party in excess of the number 
required to win that district’s election. 
 95 See id. A district is “cracked” when a minority of voters consistently lose that 
district’s election by a slim margin. Id. 
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die jumble voting populations amongst existing districts.96 Even 
when observation of past elections grants researchers and courts a 
sense of how much partisan advantage a district plan should likely 
confer, the wild variance inherent in any measurement of partisan 
advantage makes precision practically impossible.97 Understanding 
this, even experts seeking to prove the effects of partisan 
gerrymandering openly acknowledged that their findings could not 
support an inference of the legislature’s intent.98 
Instead, courts like that in Whitford do not attempt to infer the 
intent behind a partisan gerrymander from that gerrymander’s 
effects.99 The court in Whitford concluded that the “modest[] 
advantage” conferred to the Republican Party by Wisconsin’s 
political geography failed to “explain the magnitude” of the total 
partisan effect of the district plan.100 However, it based its decision 
on the less burdensome partisan effects of other plans the drafters 
considered but ultimately rejected.101 Without this context, the court 
acknowledged that the study of the effects of natural factors on 
partisan advantage “lacked specificity and careful analysis.”102 
Without this necessary specificity, the court instead based its 
                                               
 96 Report for Defendants, Nicholas Goedert at 18, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 
3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-00421-bbc) (explaining how population 
density can affect partisan advantage). 
 97 Id. at 15 (explaining that “within a single state, where small variations in 
incumbency and candidate choice may have greater impact on aggregated results, 
fluctuations across elections could be even larger”). 
 98 Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Report, Simon Jackman at 3, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. 
Supp. 3d 837 (3:15-cv-00421-bbc). 
 99 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 895 n.277 (W.D. Wis. 2016) 
(“Although we might find the Wisconsin legislature’s procedures to be 
counterproductive, the actions on which the plaintiffs rely appear simply to be par 
for the legislative course. We do not discount the possibility, however, that, in 
some other states, these actions may suggest a deviation from regular procedures 
from which an inference of discriminatory intent may arise.”). 
 100 Id. at 921, 924. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 926–27 (presenting studies on the effects of natural geography that 
relied on either data gathered after the election or hypothetical alternative district 
plans, but neither method swayed the court.). 
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holding on the existence of an alternative plan that afforded much 
less partisan advantage to the Republican party.103 
Historically, the Supreme Court has not been amenable to the 
techniques which swayed the Wisconsin District Court. In League 
of Latin American Citizens v. Perry,104 Justice Kennedy warned that 
“[e]ven assuming a court could choose reliably among different 
models of shifting voter preferences,” the Court would remain 
“wary of adopting” a standard based on “a hypothetical state of 
affairs.”105 In Gill v. Whitford,106 Chief Justice Roberts echoed this 
distaste for social science, calling the statistical evidence presented 
in Whitford “sociological gobbledygook.”107 Therefore, automated 
districting technology interferes with the public’s ability to detect 
partisan gerrymandering by blurring the line between partisan 
advantage arising naturally and partisan advantage arising from an 
intentional gerrymander. This forces plaintiffs to prove the effects 
of gerrymandering using methods not yet accepted by the Supreme 
Court. 
In sum, automated districting will interfere with the public’s 
ability to bring claims of partisan gerrymandering. By leaving 
behind as few as one witness and almost no documents, automated 
districting software will offer the public less evidence of a 
legislature’s intent to gerrymander. By pursuing legitimate 
districting factors and blurring the line between natural and 
unnatural partisan advantage, automated districting software will 
make the effects of gerrymanders even harder to detect. Combined, 
the features of automated districting software will worsen the 
already precarious state of judicial management over partisan 
gerrymandering. As Part III will argue, combatting these ill effects 
                                               
 103 Id. at 926 (“[I]t is very possible to draw a map with much less of a partisan 
bent than Act 43 and, therefore, that Act 43’s large partisan effect is not due to 
Wisconsin’s natural political geography.”). 
 104 League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 105 Id. at 419–20 (rejecting a test which compared how each party “would fare 
hypothetically if they each (in turn) had received a given percentage of the vote” 
because it would “depend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will 
reside”). 
 106 Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161). 
 107 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) 
(No. 16-1161). 
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will require independent commissions, transparent districting, or 
improved methods for measuring the partisan effects of 
gerrymandering. 
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATED DISTRICTING 
SOFTWARE 
Claimants have fought for decades to convince courts to 
recognize partisan gerrymandering claims.108 The advent of new 
technologies would not undo those decades of work and forever 
snatch partisan gerrymandering from the hands of the courts. Rather, 
automated districting software would tug partisan gerrymandering 
just out of the courts’ immediate reach by hiding or eliminating 
evidence used to satisfy the intent and effect prong of the Whitford 
standard. To counteract the effects of automated districting 
software, then, plaintiffs, courts, or society at large could (1) allow 
neutral third parties to redistrict; (2) impose transparency on the 
redistricting process; or (3) develop techniques to more accurately 
measure the effects of partisan gerrymandering. 
A. Allowing Neutral Third Parties to Redistrict 
Rather than having their power to redistrict ripped from them 
through judicial management, legislatures could recognize the 
conflict of interest presented by gerrymandering and willingly 
surrender their Article I redistricting power to third parties.109 
Reformation of the redistricting process is the most clear and direct 
way to remove the roadblocks created by automated districting 
software.110 For example, the state governments of Arizona and 
California have handed off their district-drafting powers to 
independent commissions entrusted to draft new district plans 
                                               
 108 See, e.g., Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State 
Redistricting Reform to Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 543, 547 (2011) (noting that courts seriously considered suits for partisan 
gerrymandering since as early as Davis v. Bandemer in 1986). 
 109 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 4 (conferring to legislatures the power to determine 
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections”). 
 110 See Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 108, at 555 (“State government reforms, 
on the other hand, offer the most promising avenue toward reducing excessive 
partisan gerrymandering.”). 
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without partisan considerations.111 Safety measures, such as staffing 
commissions with an even number of members from each political 
party, ensure that both parties’ interests are preserved during the 
drafting process.112 
This solution, however, depends on the Legislature’s 
willingness to surrender their redistricting power. In 2004, only 
twelve states handled redistricting through third-party 
commissions.113 As of 2016, that number rose as ten more states 
reformed their respective redistricting processes.114 As for the 
remaining states, however, only time will tell. Legislatures might 
not willingly sacrifice the power to influence election outcomes 
through gerrymandering just to avoid public backlash. If particularly 
strong gerrymanders withstand judicial scrutiny, then dominant 
legislatures might escape public backlash altogether. After all, 
stripped of their power to vote the perpetrators out of office, the 
dissenting portion of the public would be left with little recourse. 
Another possible response, the adoption of independent 
redistricting commissions, could end partisan gerrymandering 
altogether, or at least curb the practice. Some fear that partisan 
considerations will seep into third-party commissions and that the 
facial neutrality of the practice will shield the commissions from 
public suspicion.115 Even if the independent commissions are not 
faultless, they experience a less blatant conflict of interest when 
redistricting as compared to legislatures.116 Mass implementation of 
these commissions would overall reduce drafters’ incentive to craft 
                                               
 111 See id. at 556–57. 
 112 See id. (citing as an example Arizona’s five-member commission which 
consists of “no more than two from any political party”). 
 113 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 362 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 114 See Eric Petry, Redistricting Reform Gains Momentum in 2016, BRENNAN 
CENT. JUST. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/redistricting-
reform-gains-momentum-2016. 
 115 See Alan Greenblatt, Can Redistricting Ever Be Fair?, GOVERNING MAG. 
(Nov. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/can-redistricting-ever-
be-fair.html (explaining how the GOP in California suspected the state’s 
independent districting commission of secretly furthering the interests of the 
Democratic party). 
 116 See id. (recalling how “there were conflicts of interest among those doing 
the drawing” in California’s independent commission). 
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partisan gerrymanders, and this will ideally lead to less extreme 
gerrymanders nationwide. 
B. Imposing Transparency on the Redistricting Process 
Alternatively, courts or state governments could impose a 
degree of transparency upon the redistricting process by requiring 
legislatures to publish the source code of their redistricting software. 
Rather than forcing the public to scrounge for evidence of legislative 
intent after a gerrymandered plan is implemented, a transparent 
redistricting process would theoretically provide evidence of intent 
during the drafting process. The term “transparent redistricting” 
refers to a redistricting process where the public either actively 
participates in the redistricting process117 or at least receives enough 
information about the redistricting process to offer meaningful 
feedback or hold the drafters accountable for the district plan.118 
Public involvement in redistricting could involve anything from 
close attention to a district plan by hobbyists all the way to mass 
internet participation through open-source redistricting software.119 
Public disclosure of the redistricting process would, at a minimum, 
involve a complete record of the communications between the 
drafters of a plan and interested legislative parties.120 
When legislatures construct plans using automated districting 
software, all communications between the legislature and the 
                                               
 117 See, e.g., Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, How Independent 
Commissions Could Use the Internet and Open Software to Maximize 
Transparency and Public Engagement in Redistricting, SCHOLARS STRATEGY 
NETWORK (July 2014), 
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_alt
man_and_mcdonald_on_redistricting_reform_at_internet_scale_0.pdf. 
 118 See, e.g., Michael Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform 
in Local Redistricting, 11 ELECTION L.J. 446, 451 (2012) (“[F]or voters to be able 
to hold legislators accountable for redistricting decisions, the voting public must 
be properly informed about the decisions made.”). 
 119 See, e.g., Altman & McDonald, supra note 117. 
 120 BRUCE E. CAIN & KARIN MAC DONALD, TRANSPARENCY AND 
REDISTRICTING: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO COMPETITION AND REDISTRICTING 
IN CALIFORNIA: LESSONS FOR REFORM 1–2 (2006) (“The basic components of 
openness are: a definition of what constitutes a meeting, notification of the 
meeting time and place, an agenda prepared in advance, opportunities for public 
input and stipulations of exceptions.”). 
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drafters are necessarily present in the program’s code and the data 
used. Supplied with a redistricting software’s code and the data it 
used, third parties could replicate that software’s results to 
understand what, how, and why the software constructed the 
district.121 In other words, automated districting software could 
become the perfect witness for holding legislative bodies 
accountable for the effects of district plans, provided that the 
software is readily accessible to the public.122 
Unfortunately, legislatures may be able to withhold the 
information required to transform automated districting software 
into a perfect witness. The “Speech and Debate” clause of the 
Constitution provides that “for any Speech or Debate in either 
House, [members of the House or Congress] shall not be questioned 
in any other Place.”123 Many state constitutions parallel this clause.124 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether these clauses 
include a non-disclosure right to legislatures.125 This uncertainty has 
split the federal circuits.126 The D.C. Circuit interprets the Speech 
and Debate clause to confer broad non-disclosure rights, but the 
Ninth and Third Circuit do not.127 In light of this uncertainty, some 
state courts have also interpreted the Speech and Debate clause to 
                                               
 121 Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers 
in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 105 (2010) (“Full 
transparency thus requires that redistricting plans be made available in non-
proprietary formats that are easily read . . . .”). 
 122 Id. 
 123 U.S. CONST. ART I, § 6. 
 124 See Michael L. Shenkman, Talking About Speech or Debate: Revisiting 
Legislative Immunity, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 363 n.58 (2013) (noting 
how courts have “discussed the shared history underlying the Constitution’s 
Speech or Debate Clause and parallel legislative immunity provisions in many 
state constitutions”). 
 125 Philip Mayer, An Uncertain Privilege: Reexamining the Scope and 
Protections of the Speech or Debate Clause, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 229, 
238 (2017) (“The Court has not resolved whether the Clause’s protections 
‘include a privilege not to disclose documents that fall within the sphere of 
legislative activity, as opposed to a privilege that merely bars the evidentiary use 
of such documents.’”) (quoting S.E.C. v. The Comm. on Ways & Means of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F. Supp. 3d 199, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 126 Id. at 238–39. 
 127 Id. 
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include non-disclosure privileges for state legislatures.128 In the 
context of racial gerrymandering, some have worried that, due to the 
difficulty of establishing intent in cases of gerrymandering, “[i]f 
future plaintiffs were cut off from discovering information like . . . 
written correspondence . . . members of Congress and redistricting 
bodies generally would be insulated from scrutiny by private 
litigants.”129 Due to the equally difficult standard of intent for 
partisan gerrymandering explained in Part II, this fear should extend 
with equal force to cases of partisan gerrymandering. 
Just as state legislatures can lend away their power to redistrict, 
so too can they give up the protection of the Speech and Debate 
clause.130 Modeled after the Freedom of Information Act, state 
“sunshine laws” impose requirements on legislatures to reveal to the 
public information that they otherwise could have kept secret.131 To 
combat partisan gerrymandering, state legislatures could create for 
themselves a duty to record and publish the districting process, even 
if that process consists of code from automated districting software. 
As with independent commissions, however, this solution relies on 
the legislature’s willingness to self-regulate. Further, transparent 
districting at most satisfies the intent prong of the partisan 
gerrymandering standard. To bring a successful claim, plaintiffs still 
need a reliable way to measure the effects of partisan gerrymanders. 
C. Measuring the Effects of Partisan Gerrymanders to Identify 
Gross Disparity 
New techniques for measuring partisan advantage would allow 
plaintiffs to cut through the obfuscating effects of automated 
districting software by inferring an intent to gerrymander from that 
gerrymander’s effects. Inferring intent from effects requires 
plaintiffs to show a “gross disparity” between an observed value and 
                                               
 128 Edward Collaghan, Speech and Debate, 16 TOURO L. REV. 709, 711–12 
(2000) (explaining how New York state courts used the Speech and Debate Clause 
to justify the legislature’s non-disclosure of a “computer modeling system for the 
funding of public schools”). 
 129 Mark Tyson, Monitored Disclosure: A Way to Avoid Legislative Supremacy 
in Redistricting Litigation, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2012). 
 130 See id. 
 131 Id. 
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an expected value to indicate the presence of discrimination.132 In 
other words, what happened clearly differed from what should have 
happened. Thanks to many years of study, social scientists already 
have multiple metrics for partisan advantage,133 or, as Chief Justice 
Roberts would call them, “sociological gobbledygook.”134 
Fortunately, courts already employ similar “gobbledygook”135 in 
other areas of law—such as toxic torts,136 environmental law,137 and 
employment discrimination138—without litigation devolving into an 
endless battle of experts. As in those other areas of law, judicial 
management would curb extreme abuses of law without 
overburdening the courts. 
There is a long history of “gobbledygook”139 persuading courts 
in the absence of other evidence. For example, in Allen v. United 
States,140 plaintiffs alleged that open-air atomic bomb tests had 
resulted in multiple deaths by radiation poisoning.141 Though the 
court of appeals later found in favor of the government,142 the lower 
court properly articulated how statistical evidence can establish 
                                               
 132 Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977). 
 133 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2, at 835–36. 
 134 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, supra note 107, at 2289. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2268 (2015) (“In toxic tort cases, findings of causation 
typically rely on epidemiological evidence, which relies heavily on statistical 
analyses and mathematical or computer modeling to make probabilistic 
determinations of risk and contribution.”). 
 137 See id. at 2268–69 (explaining how environmental law claims “rely heavily 
on statistical and modeling methods, and these fields also tend to be able to only 
predict risks based on observed correlations”). 
 138 See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 
WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1281 (1988) (explaining how, even though natural factors 
can create wage disparities, “statistical imbalance in the work force” can 
nevertheless act as evidence for an intent to discriminate). 
 139 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, supra note 107, at 2289. 
 140 Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 257–58 (D. Utah 1984) overruled 
by Allen v. Unites States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
the actions taken by the government fell under a “discretionary function 
exception” that prevented relief). 
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causation even in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence.143 
As the power of computers increased, computer modeling became a 
powerful litigation tool in toxic torts and environmental law.144 
Specifically, in these fields, courts consider computer modeling as 
an “accepted and, in appropriate circumstances, reliable method . . . 
where contamination cannot be traced entirely to a specific source 
and when the extent of contamination is difficult to determine.”145 
As automated districting masks the source and magnitude of 
partisan advantage, plaintiffs bringing claims of partisan 
gerrymandering should similarly use computer modeling as a 
reliable method of proving causation. Recently, several studies have 
adopted new computing algorithms to generate a representative 
sample of randomized alternative district plans.146 These studies 
define a solution space of possible alternative plans the legislature 
could have successfully submitted and then randomly generate a 
sample of plans within that solution space without using partisan 
data.147 If the algorithms do not use partisan data, it would be 
impossible for them to intentionally generate gerrymandered district 
plans.148 Therefore, one would expect that a large enough sample 
                                               
 143 Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 416 (“Where the injuries are causally 
indistinguishable, and where experts cannot determine whether an individual 
injury arises from culpable human cause or non-culpable natural causes, evidence 
that there is an increased incidence of the injury in a population following 
exposure to defendant’s risk-creating conduct may justify an inference of ‘causal 
linkage’ between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injuries.”) (citation omitted). 
 144 See Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 136, at 2268 (“In toxic tort 
cases, findings of causation typically rely on epidemiological evidence, which 
relies heavily on statistical analyses and mathematical or computer modeling to 
make probabilistic determinations of risk and contribution.”). 
 145 City of Wichita, Kansas v. Trustees of APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Tr., 306 
F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1108 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 146 See Mira Bernstein & Moon Duchin, A Formula Goes to Court: Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, PHYSICS AND SOC’Y 5 (2017), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10812. 
 147 See Gregory Herschlag et al., Evaluating Partisan Gerrymandering in 
Wisconsin 1 (2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.01596 (explaining how “none of 
[their] design criteria have any partisan tilt,” and so the algorithm has no data on 
partisan advantage with which it could craft a gerrymander). 
 148 See id. (explaining how “none of [their] design criteria have any partisan 
tilt,” and so the algorithm has no data on partisan advantage with which it could 
craft a gerrymander). 
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generated by these algorithms would represent the average district 
plan a voter would receive in the absence of a gerrymander. 
These studies run the risk that their simulated elections fail to 
accurately reflect reality.149 For a district plan to fall within the 
solution space, it must be one that the legislature could have 
reasonably adopted in place of the gerrymandered plan. To be 
reasonably adopted, a district plan must be constitutional and 
desirable.150 To be constitutional, a district plan must be contiguous, 
must have districts of relatively equal size, and must comply with 
the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by having enough majority-minority 
districts.151 These requirements are generally easier to measure and 
define. To be desirable, however, a district plan must be compact 
and must not split too many communities of interest.152 A plan with 
worm-like districts whose borders split roads and towns would be 
rejected even though no constitutional requirements prevent its 
adoption. When attempting to define a solution space for alternative 
district plans, these factors become problematic because they are 
decided based on visual scrutiny and the vague weighing of 
interests. Plenty of models can maximize desirable factors like 
compactness,153 but the question “when would a district plan be 
rejected based on compactness or split-counties?” is ultimately 
subjective. Even when state laws require districts to be drawn so 
“not irregularly shaped”154 or to “coincide with the boundaries of 
political subdivisions of the State,”155 the weight of those factors 
against others depends on the priorities of the legislature. For 
example, drafters could reasonably turn down plans that maximize 
compactness in favor of plans with more equal population. 
                                               
 149 See Trustees of APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Tr., 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 
(“[A] model is only an estimate and the accuracy of the estimate depends to a 
considerable extent on the data selected for use in the computer model, the quality 
and reliability of that data and, of course, the skill of the modeler.”). 
 150 See Herschlag et al., supra note 147, at 1 (designing its representative sample 
based on “redistricting plans that satisfy design criteria laid out in the Wisconsin 
constitution, statutes, and relevant court cases”). 
 151 See, e.g., Chen & Cottrell, supra note 87, at 336. 
 152 See H.B. 92, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.C. 2015). 
 153 See, e.g., Altman & McDonald, supra note 56, at 4. 
 154 N.C. H.B. 92. 
 155 Id. at 92 § 120-4.54(e). 
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Therefore, any attempt to define a solution space for all possible 
alternative district plans risks introducing bias by objectively 
defining subjective boundaries. 
Further, because voters do not cast new ballots for simulated 
district plans, researchers must use data collected from the voting 
tabulation districts (VTDs) of real elections. VTDs are the small 
polling stations where votes are tabulated before they are 
compiled.156 They act as the smallest unit of measurement when 
analyzing vote distribution.157 Plugging election results directly from 
VTDs into computer-generated district plans assumes that each 
VTD would have produced the same or similar vote share even 
under a different district plan. However, that is not necessarily the 
case. Just as the proportion of a minority population in a district 
changes that demographic’s voter turnout,158 so too does a political 
party’s representation in a district change that party’s voter 
turnout.159 District plans also affect other factors that influence 
election results, such as campaign spending and whether to contest 
a district by putting forward a candidate.160 Therefore, applying the 
VTD data from one district plan to another introduces bias because 
VTD data would change between district plans. 
Recent approaches using Markov-Chain Monte Carlo 
algorithms may help to overcome these challenges.161 Rather than 
attempting to define the outer limits of a solution space for 
alternative district plans, these projects focus in the opposite 
direction by defining its solution space in terms of compliance with 
legitimate districting factors, such as compactness, equal 
population, preservation of communities of interest, and compliance 
                                               
 156 See JONATHAN C. MATTINGLY & CHRISTY VAUGHN, REDISTRICTING AND 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 1 (2014), https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.8796. 
 157 See id. at 1 (designing a program to construct a representative sample of 
reasonable district plans using real data from Voting Tabulation Districts). 
 158 See, e.g., Bernard Fraga, Redistricting and the Causal Impact of Race on 
Voter Turnout, 78 J. POL. 19, 19 (2015). 
 159 See Simon Hix et al., The Effects of District Magnitude on Voting Behavior, 
79 J. POL. 356, 360 (2017). 
 160 See Jamie L. Carson et al., Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on 
Electoral Competition, 1972–2012, 14 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 165, 174 (2014). 
 161 See Herschlag et al., supra note 147, at 7; see also Chen & Cottrell, supra 
note 87, at 329. 
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with the VRA.162 From there, the algorithm takes a random walk 
through possible variations of that district plan by repeatedly 
tweaking the plan.163 This process results in an “ensemble” of district 
plans that represent the possible district plans that could have been 
drafted in the absence of an intent to gerrymander.164 By situating 
actual district plans alongside this ensemble, researchers can 
determine whether the real district plans fall outside the expected 
range of partisan advantage.165 The greater the difference between 
the ensemble and the actual plan, the greater the likelihood that the 
actual plan is a partisan gerrymander.166 
To address the issue of different plans modifying voter behavior, 
these new studies do not confine themselves to a single voting 
outcome. Rather, they compare the performance of Republican and 
Democratic political parties across a range of possible voting 
outcomes based on multiple elections and average variation.167 
Because these studies considered voting outcomes beyond those 
observed, their results do not depend on how voters would react to 
their hypothetical districts. The studies address the full range of 
probable voting outcomes, leading their models to more closely 
reflect reality. 
Studies generating control groups of alternative district plans 
through the use of computer simulation have already gained some 
attention in the courts. For example, during oral arguments in Gill v. 
Whitford, Justice Kagan asked whether these computer-generated 
plans could serve as “a way to filter out the effects of geography 
from the effects of partisan advantage” if plaintiffs were to provide 
“many, many of them, so that one can tell whether the actual map is 
                                               
 162 See id. (“The probability distribution will be concentrated on redistricting 
plans which better satisfy the design specified in the laws and legal precedents 
covering redistricting plans . . . .”). 
 163 See id. at 8. 
 164 See id. at 1. 
 165 See id. (explaining how the comparison between the 2012 Wisconsin district 
plan and an algorithmically generated ensemble of alternative plans acted as 
evidence that the 2012 Wisconsin plan was an intentional gerrymander). 
 166 Id. 
 167 See id. at 8 (explaining how the study began by testing each plan using 
observed election results and then expanded those tests to include voting 
outcomes within 7.5% of the observed values). 
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an outlier.”168 The plaintiffs replied in the affirmative and referred to 
a study conducted by Jowei Chen which created 200 alternative 
district plans using an algorithm.169 They expressed optimism in 
these programs, calling them “state of the art” and predicting that 
“they will be in the record in almost every case.”170 
Others have expressed less optimism. The State in Gill 
foreshadowed a time where the judicial managing of partisan 
gerrymandering would “shift districting from elected public 
officials to federal courts, who would decide the fate of maps based 
upon battles of the experts.”171 This bleak outlook considers a world 
where plaintiffs turn the techniques used to craft partisan 
gerrymanders back against the legislature.172 Instead of seeing an 
end to partisan gerrymandering, this situation could threaten to 
create a never-ending battle of experts where the prowess of the 
mathematician—not the facts of the case—determines the outcome. 
In this world of “math versus math, with democracy at stake,”173 
judicial interference with the districting process would afflict, not 
alleviate, the voter’s constitutional rights. 
That world cannot exist in perpetuity. If courts adopt a legal 
standard for the judicial management of partisan gerrymandering, a 
wave of claims would crash into courtrooms across the nation. This 
will arise from the uncertainty inherent in any new legal standard 
involving statistical evidence.174 Seeing this period of uncertainty on 
                                               
 168 Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–56, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 
(2017) (No. 16-1161). 
 169 Id. at 55–56. 
 170 Id. at 55–57. 
 171 Id. at 3. 
 172 Id. at 15 (explaining how it would be fair for the public to take techniques 
used to create partisan gerrymanders and use “those same techniques, which have 
become extremely sophisticated, . . . to evaluate what they’re doing”). 
 173 Jordan Ellenberg, How Computers Turned Gerrymandering Into a Science, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/sunday/computers-
gerrymandering-wisconsin.html. 
 174 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 303, 309 (3d ed., 2011) (“The 
reality that statistical analysis generates probabilities concerning relationships 
rather than certainty should not be seen in itself as an argument against the use of 
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the horizon instills the powerful yet unfounded fear that the 
uncertainty will last forever. However, the initial wave of litigation 
will act as a period of refinement and adjustment, not as an eternal 
battleground for mathematicians. 
The battle of experts is one-sided. When legislatures develop 
new ways to disguise partisan gerrymanders, they do not beat back 
or contest the public’s ability to detect those gerrymanders. Instead, 
they identify the fringes of the public’s ability to detect 
gerrymanders and create district plans that maximize partisan 
advantage within that undetectable zone. Since partisan 
gerrymandering first reached the Supreme Court, judges have 
recognized that legislatures can use math to hide partisan 
gerrymanders.175 When the public could only identify gerrymanders 
by the naked eye, legislatures only sought to fool the human eye by 
complying with districting factors and appearing as a legitimate 
district.176 Math penetrates this surface-level disguise. When faced 
with a representative sample of tens of thousands of alternative plans 
that each comply with traditional districting criteria equally well,177 
or an observational study demonstrating the plan’s “historically 
large” partisan advantage,178 visual similarity to legitimate 
districting plans fails to mask the gerrymander. Now that the public 
uses math to detect partisan gerrymanders, legislatures seeking to 
gerrymander will need to reduce the partisan advantage they 
incorporate into their district plans to remain undetectable. As 
techniques to detect partisan gerrymandering improve, this range of 
undetectability shrinks. 
To understand this one-sided relationship, consider the 
following hypothetical. A factory dumps waste into an adjacent 
                                               
statistical evidence, or worse, as a reason to not admit that there is uncertainty at 
all.”). 
 175 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983) (explaining how “rapid 
advances in computer technology” allow legislatures to further “secondary goals” 
while complying with traditional districting factors). 
 176 See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 889 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (“Highly 
sophisticated mapping software now allows lawmakers to pursue partisan 
advantage without sacrificing compliance with traditional districting criteria.”). 
 177 See Herschlag et al., supra note 147, at 1. 
 178 Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 908. 
DEC. 2017] BIASED MACHINES 97 
river. The public implements a law prohibiting the dumping of that 
waste. In response, the factory employs advanced mathematical 
techniques to determine exactly how much waste they can dump 
without being spotted by the naked eye. Later, the public develops a 
better way to test the water for the factory’s waste. With all the math 
in the world, the factory can at best recalculate exactly how much 
waste it can dump without being detected by this new technique. 
Despite the factory’s best efforts, improvements in the public’s 
ability to detect the factory’s waste will force the factory to dump 
less waste into the river. 
Experts bringing claims against partisan gerrymanders will 
mirror experts detecting waste in the river, and experts defending 
partisan gerrymanders will mirror the experts calculating how much 
waste could go undetected. The ensuing battle will be less a game 
of tug of war and more a game of hide and seek. Continued advances 
in the public’s ability to detect partisan gerrymandering will 
constrict legislatures’ ability to craft those gerrymanders undetected. 
Due to the difficulty of measuring partisan advantage, some 
mathematicians predict that there may be a point where no amount 
of math can distinguish between an ordinary plan and a partisan 
gerrymander.179 Even if that point exists, however, it should not 
prevent the judicial management of partisan gerrymandering. Until 
experts reach this limit of detection, judicial involvement in partisan 
gerrymandering will shrink the amount of partisan advantage 
present in district plans. In this way, improvements in the 
hypothetical generation of alternative district plans will allow 
plaintiffs to bring increasingly effective claims, even in the face of 
heightened burdens of proof. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Without additional law or better techniques for generating 
alternative district plans, legislatures will sidestep claims of partisan 
gerrymandering by using automated districting software. For courts 
                                               
 179 Ellenberg, supra note 173 (“There will be many cases, maybe most of them, 
where it’s impossible, no matter how much math you do, to tell the difference 
between innocuous decision making and a scheme—like Wisconsin’s—designed 
to protect one party from voters who might prefer the other.”). 
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to manage partisan gerrymandering, plaintiffs must bring claims 
under a First or Fourteenth Amendment framework, and those 
claims will require proof that the legislature intended to 
discriminate.180 Presently, experts cannot infer an intent to 
discriminate from even “historically large”181 instances of partisan 
gerrymandering.182 This leaves potential plaintiffs with only direct 
evidence, such as witness testimony, or circumstantial evidence, 
such as the drafting process, to prove discriminatory intent. 
Automated districting software eliminates both categories of 
evidence, presenting plaintiffs with a difficult burden of proof 
before they can persuade courts to intervene. 
New laws that hand the power to draft new districts away to 
independent commissions and similar laws that impose a degree of 
transparency on the drafting process could eliminate the need for the 
evidence obscured by automated districting software. More likely, 
however, advancements in Monte Carlo algorithms will create 
increasingly large and accurate representative samples of alternative 
districting plans. By comparing these alternative plans to actual 
district plans, researchers will detect gerrymandered outliers with 
enough significance to infer intent even when all other evidence 
remains hidden. Though computer-generated district plans might 
not spell the end for partisan gerrymandering, it at least may resolve 
the issues created by automated districting software, allowing for a 
fairer democratic process. 
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